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Abstract 
 
Conventional banks which once were competing with non-banking financial institutions and 
capital markets today face the new challenge of being reintermediated by Islamic banks.  
Earlier academic research has been debating over disintermediation and reintermediation of 
conventional banks, but consistently failed to address reintermediation through Islamic banks 
as a possibility. This study, however, fills the void by addressing the novel possibility of 
reintermediation “within” the banking sector and is the first attempt to analyze and compare 
Islamic and conventional banks from the perspective of reintermediated financial markets. 
After identifying the reintermediation trends led by Islamic banks we investigate several bank 
specific financial and non-financial characteristics that might have enabled Islamic banks to 
emerge as an important player in reintermediated financial markets. By keeping our focus on 
slightly modified version of CAMELS framework where ‘S’ represents “Service Quality” we 
find that along with better capitalization (C) and improved liquidity (L), better service quality 
(S) is another distinguished feature of Islamic banks that might be linked with their high 
degree of intermediation. 
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1 Introduction 
The current literature on financial intermediation is debating whether financial markets 
are moving towards disintermediation or towards reintermediation. Earlier, literature in 
the 1970s brought forth the idea that disintermediation of financial intermediaries and 
banks had occurred, where the term disintermediation, an antonym for intermediation
1
, 
was used to signify a financial system in an economy where lenders (or savers) and 
borrowers (or investors) engage in direct financial transactions, without utilizing the 
services of a financial intermediary in between them. (Gurley and Shaw, 1955). Among 
the reasons for disintermediation given in literature, prominent ones included the 
possibility of liquidity crisis (Goldfeld and Jaffee, 1970), unsustainable business models 
of commercial banks (Hendershott, 1971), increasing competition from enhanced 
financial markets (Allen & Gale, 1997), strong competition from the stock market which 
undermines banks’ ability to provide intertemporal risk smoothing (Deidda and Fattouh, 
2008), and the long-run movement away from traditional demand for interest (DeYoung 
and Torna, 2013). According to Thakor, (1996), a certain level of disintermediation is 
considered inevitable in any economy. However, this claim has not been justified 
empirically.2 
1.1 Disintermediation or Reintermediation?  
Contrary to the theories regarding disintermediation, studies from late 1990s 
claimed that the phenomenon of financial disintermediation has not been understood 
properly: financial intermediation has not decreased, but instead the role of banks has 
decreased, while the role of non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs) has increased; and 
this switch in power was termed as the reintermediation of financial system (Rajan, 2006; 
Schmidt et al., 1999; Scholtens and Wensveen, 2000). Some authors though, emphasize 
that banks and capital markets have both complementary and competing roles 
(Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). When banks and NBFIs operate side by side and 
supersede each other’s actions, reintermediation can be thought to occur, as in this case, 
traditional structures of FIs will change and they will strive to reestablish themselves in 
                                                             
1Intermediation is the issuance of debt by financial intermediaries, in soliciting loanable funds from 
surplus spending units, and allocating these loanable funds among deficit units whose direct debt 
they absorb. (Gurley & Shaw, 1955. Page 519) 
2 See Bernanke, (1988), King and Levine, (1993) and Pagano, (1993)  
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the new environment (Domowitz, 2002), while the essence of financial intermediation 
would be the same. Merton & Bodie, (1995) and Allen and Santomero, (1998) in their 
studies have in fact stated that theory on FIs has moved from an ‘institutional 
perspective’ to a ‘functional perspective’. An institutional perspective on the theory of 
FIs was one that focused on studying differing organizational structures and procedures 
of different forms of intermediaries, such as commercial banks versus investment banks. 
On the other hand, the relatively new functional perspective focused on the services 
provided by intermediaries irrespective of institutional types. Scholtens and Wensveen, 
(2000) also propagated that the world is not moving towards disintermediation, but 
instead towards reintermediation. Furthermore, Rajan, (2006) showed, by using empirical 
data from late 1990’s and early years of the twenty-first century, that there were 
significant developments in the financial sector during this time that led to what he 
termed commodification (greater availability of public information, standardization of 
financial contracts and securitization). Domowitz (2002) attributed such structural 
changes in the financial system as important drivers of reintermediation. Perhaps 
disintermediation was never a possibility because financial markets and investors always 
appreciated the lesson that disintermediation is costly (Fang et al., 2015; Morrison, 2005). 
Consequently, a better explanation for the decreased role of banks over time was “the 
reintermediation”.  
 
1.2 Reintermediation and Islamic Banks 
Hence, though the literature in the 1970s argued for the case of disintermediation, 
the literature on financial reintermediation has propagated the view that financial systems 
are evolving so as to meet the needs of the current century. In our opinion however, 
among the recent developments in the financial system
3
, the most important aspect is the 
growth of Islamic banking. For example, current trends in Islamic and conventional 
banking show that the growth rates of Islamic banking have overtaken conventional 
                                                             
3 We acknowledge that the other financial developments are also taking place simultaneously, like 
Fin Tech, while old competition still persists (NBFIs). However, the focus of this paper is to study the 
challenge posed by Islamic banks, and while other aspects of the process of reintermediation are not 
considered, they could be studied in other papers as “cybermediation”. 
Cybermediation (http://www.jamieparfitt.com/blog/2014/5/4/disintermediation-
reintermediation-and-cybermediation)   
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banking growth rates. A recent study shows that the assets for Islamic banking had a 
higher growth rate than conventional banking assets from the years 2010 and 2014, 
totaling 14 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively. According to the study, the Islamic 
banking sector experienced tremendous growth that surpassed the growth rates of 
conventional banks in nearly all the countries that were considered. In 2014 Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia experienced double digit growth rates at 20 per cent and 18 per cent 
respectively, while conventional banking lagged behind at 7 per cent growth rates for 
both cases. The study estimates that in the QISMUT+3 countries, the worth of Islamic 
banking assets would reach $1.8 trillion by 2020 (EY, 2016)
4
. It is interesting to note that 
due to the promising growth of Islamic banking, the conventional banks have started 
offering customized financial products to cater the needs of customers with orientation 
towards this particular sector. All these trends and movements not only indicate the 
increasing prominence of Islamic banks but also show the concerns and intentions of CBs 
to structurally change themselves and thus represent reintermediation “within” the 
banking system. Although the idea of reintermediation is well-worn, there is no formal 
study to our knowledge that has analyzed Islamic and Conventional banks from this 
perspective. It thus becomes inevitable to test our conjecture that conventional banks, 
once the major player in financial market; and were competing only with the capital 
market and NBFIs, could become substitutable by their new competitor in future. The 
idea of Islamic banks replacing conventional banks however, is not put forth as an 
immediate event, but a likely upcoming possibility. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
It comes as no surprise that a strand of literature has recently emerged that put 
forward the idea of comparison of conventional banks by the steadily growing sector of 
Islamic banks. In these studies, Islamic banks have been found to have low risk (Abedifar 
et al., 2015; Baele et al., 2014), are seen to aid overall banking system and economic 
development (Gheeraert, 2014) and their profit efficiency is found to be inversely related 
to their default risk (Saeed and Izzeldin, 2014). Some authors contrarily are of the view 
that there are no significant differences between risk and return relationships of Islamic 
                                                             
4 Note: QISMUT+3 countries are Qatar, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, UAE, Turkey, Pakistan, 
Kuwait and Bahrain. 
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and conventional banks. For example, Mohamad et. al. (2008) and Bader et. al. (2008) 
conclude that there is no significant difference between cost, profit and revenue 
efficiencies of conventional versus Islamic banks, irrespective of age, size and 
geographical location of banks. Similarly, by using a sample of banks from Turkey over 
the period 1990 till 2000, and by using stochastic frontier analysis, El-Gamal and 
Inanoglu (2005) also come to a similar conclusion. But predominately, more recent 
studies do find that Islamic banks are at least as efficient as their conventional 
counterparts, more resilient during crisis (Hasan & Dridi, 2010) and financial panics 
(Farooq & Zaheer 2015) and less risky in most cases (See the literature survey by 
Abedifar et al, 2015). These include studies by Rashwan (2010), Abdul-Majid et. al. 
(2010; 2011a, b) and Beck et. al. (2013).5 However, we believe one of the limitations of 
previous literature was that no studies tried to explore the possibility of reintermediation 
of conventional banks driven by the Islamic banks; and which financial or non-financial 
factors might explain this evolving trend.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, (2010) in their study seemingly referred to 
reintermediation when they discussed their findings, i.e. replacement of traditional bank 
intermediation by new and renewed forms of financial intermediation. However, they 
primarily focused on how risk and return relationships of banks have changed during 
1999-2007; and above all, Islamic banks constituted only a small percentage of their 
overall sample. Beck et al., (2013) extended the work of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 
(2010) and empirically investigated the business model, efficiency and stability of 
Islamic banks compared to conventional banks. Only towards the end of their study, they 
tested reintermediation6, but only with reference to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and 
found that Islamic banks disintermediated less as compared to conventional banks during 
crisis. Consequently, a gap existed in the literature regarding the connection between 
reintermediation and Islamic banks as Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, (2010) did not 
explore this question explicitly with reference to Islamic banks, and Beck et al., (2013) 
limited this analysis to the time period of GFC. This study thus addresses these 
                                                             
5 Please refer to Abedifar et al., (2015) for a survey of relevant papers. 
6 The three ratios used by (Beck et al., 2013) include (i) ratio of fee-based to total operating income, 
(ii) of non-deposit funding to total funding, and (iv) loan-to-deposit ratio, as suggested by Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga, (2010) 
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limitations at length by first including a larger sample of Islamic banks (152) and second 
by using a longer sample period (2004 - 2015), to establish empirically that financial 
markets are in fact, moving towards reintermediation within the banking sector, and that 
the emergence of Islamic banks is one of the characteristics of global reintermediated 
financial system.  
This study makes some important contribution in the existing body of relevant 
literature.  We first evaluate the growth of banks’ assets and loans, loan to deposit ratio, 
loans as a ratio of total earning asset and gross loans’ growth for both conventional and 
Islamic banks for the sample period 2004-2015. This is interesting as it would illustrate 
the (re)intermediation trends within the banking sector. Second, we empirically test for 
various bank specific financial and non-financial characteristics that could have enabled 
Islamic banks to challenge conventional banks and emerge as an important player of 
reintermediated financial markets. Specifically, we analyze the business model of Islamic 
and conventional banks using CAMELS variables where various known ratios have been 
used to proxy C, A, M, E and L. We however, propose and use an interesting variable 
i.e., ‘service quality’ rather than ‘sensitivity’ to proxy S in CAMELS which in addition to 
financial ratios brings customers’ perspective in explaining the phenomenon of 
reintermediation. We believe it is imperative to assess the performance of Islamic and 
conventional banks vis-à-vis their service quality dimension, as it in fact forms the very 
essence of today’s service-oriented banking sector activity (Rajnith, 2013; Johnston, 
1997). 
Our results based on various fixed effects (LSDV) panel regressions show that 
Islamic banks are intermediating significantly more as compared to their conventional 
counterparts.  This analysis is robust to the subsample period and across income groups. 
We successfully identify a significant role played by the CAMELS factors in enabling 
Islamic banks to take a lead in performing the core reintermediation function of the 
global banking sector. However, country characteristics are found to play an important 
role in determining reintermediation and bank performance as we find that not all 
countries have the same lending business for Islamic banks compared to conventional 
banks. In countries where Islamic banks exhibit high intermediation trends, banks are 
better capitalized and more liquid, and the reverse is true for countries showing low 
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intermediation by Islamic banks. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 describes our dataset. Section 3 provides the details of our methodology and 
explains the models being employed to test reintermediation in financial market and to 
explore plausible explanations for the emerging trends. Section 4 presents first our 
descriptive statistics analysis; and then reports our results for baseline regressions along 
with some robustness checks including Islamic banks post GFC, Islamic banks vis-à-vis 
income group and Islamic banks at country level. Section 6 concludes and discusses the 
role of Islamic banks in the global reintermediated financial market. 
2 Data 
We use annual data from a global database, Bankscope. The initial search criterion was to 
select those countries which at least had the Islamic bank. This resulted in an initial 
sample of 33 countries with 652 banks (486 Conventional and 166 Islamic). However, in 
order to make the comparison robust, those countries were dropped which had only one 
Islamic bank. This left us with the total of 21 countries in the sample having 640 banks 
(486 Conventional and 154 Islamic).  
As Bankscope provides data on listed, unlisted and delisted banks and the reasons for 
being delisted can be numerous that might have confounded with our analysis of service 
quality, therefore, we dropped delisted banks (22) from our sample. Consequently, the 
final dataset consisted of 618 banks which include 250 listed banks (183 Conventional 
and 67 Islamic) and 368 unlisted banks (283 Conventional and 85 Islamic). We use 
unconsolidated data when available in Bankscope, and consolidated data if 
unconsolidated data are not available for a specific bank, in order not to double count 
subsidiaries of international banks and some large domestic banks. All countries in the 
sample have two or more conventional banks, with the exception of Iran, which has only 
one conventional bank operating in the country, due to its Islamized economic system. 
Table 1 shows banking sector structure in sample countries. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Time series in Bankscope were spread across the years 1987 to 2015 at the time 
of our study. We intended to use the longest time period available and possible. However, 
as the period before 2004 had many missing observations, especially for Islamic banks, 
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we restricted our sample from 2004 till 2015. This was done in order to ensure that our 
results are meaningful by basing them on actual observations.  
We use four ratios: asset growth, loan-deposit ratio, loan to earnings assets and 
gross loans growth as the measures for intermediation. Loan-deposit ratio has been 
defined in literature to explain the intermediation level of banks. A higher loan-deposit 
ratio signifies that a bank intermediates more of the deposits it receives (Beck et. al., 
2013); and demonstrates higher intermediation efficiency (Beck et. al., 2009).  Similarly, 
loan and the earning assets are the two important categories of a bank’s output vector 
when conducting their intermediation task. Loans are a bank's primary concern as their 
output, while earnings assets signify the capital base, which a bank has earned through its 
investors and depositors. The ratio of these two hence signifies intermediation (Hasan et. 
al., 2009). In addition to these two primary ratios of intermediation, assets growth 
and gross loans growth are also the important output measures of a financial institution. 
Both of these measures indicate an increase in the business of lending by a bank, and 
hence are valid intermediation ratios (Sealey & Lindley, 1977). 
We also use fee-income and non-deposit lending ratios to explain the business 
orientation of banks along with various bank specific financial and non-financial 
characteristics grouped under the acronym CAMELS that could have enabled Islamic 
banks to emerge as an important characteristic of reintermediated financial markets. For 
instance, equity ratio and total capital ratio for capital adequacy (C), loan loss reserves 
ratio and non-performing loans ratio for asset quality (A), cost-income ratio and 
overheads ratio for management (M), return on average equity and return on average 
assets for earnings quality (E), liquid assets ratio for liquidity (L), and employee-deposit 
ratio for service quality (S) have been used. In addition, we use fixed asset ratio (Fixed 
Assets/Total Assets), non-lending asset ratio (Non Loan Earning Assets/Total Earning 
Assets) and the natural logarithm of total assets as controls following (Beck et al., 2013).7 
While most of these measures have been used by Beck et al., (2013) in their analysis 
while investigating the business model, efficiency and stability of Islamic banks 
compared to conventional banks, some of these are unique to particular studies. For 
                                                             
7 This was done in order to control for the size of banks, and also because we wanted to ensure that our 
results are driven by only the lending business of the bank. 
9 
 
example, employee-deposit ratio has been used as a measure by Lages and Fernandes, 
(2005) in their multi-item instrument technique for measuring service personal values, 
though their analysis was not limited to studying the service quality of banks. Similarly, 
loan loss reserves ratio as a measure of asset quality has been used by Wanke et al., 
(2016) for performing an efficiency assessment of the Malaysian dual banking system. 
We use ratios directly from Bankscope, where they were available, while others have 
been constructed using two to three items in the database. Moreover, in line with the 
previous literature on intermediation (for example, Beck et. al., 2013), our variables are 
winsorized at 5% and 95%.  
We include CAMELS variables because we wanted to explore whether customers 
are going to Islamic banks as they are more stable, better capitalized, liquid, efficient, 
profitable, and/ or their service quality was better than conventional banks. Although 
CAMELS variables have been used in the literature before8, to the best of our knowledge, 
no study has attempted to use these measures in order to study the high/ low 
intermediation ratios of either conventional or Islamic banks. Moreover, we include 
service quality as one of our measures, which has been ignored by the existing literature. 
Service quality (S) in addition to financial ratios, aids in bringing customers’ perspective 
in explaining the phenomenon of reintermediation. As discussed earlier, we believe it is 
imperative to assess the performance of Islamic and conventional banks vis-à-vis their 
service quality dimension, as it in fact forms the very essence of today’s service-oriented 
banking sector activity.  
3 Methodology 
3.1 Baseline Model 
Our empirical methodology is two-fold. First, we establish that reintermediation has in 
fact occurred, which is shown from intermediation regressions; and second, we analyze 
the financial and non-financial aspects of Islamic banks in comparison to the 
conventional banks in detail, which might provide us with a plausible explanation for 
these emerging trends. 
                                                             
8 Other studies which have used CAMELS measures include, but are not limited to, Cole and Gunther, 
(1995); Cole et al., (1993); Zhao et al., (2009); Seçme et al., (2009); Doumpos and Zopounidis, (2010); 
Maghyereh and Awartani, (2014); and Betz et al., (2014). 
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We use a panel data setting in LSDV (least square dummy variable) form with 
cross section weights. LSDV is essentially the fixed effects model and can conveniently 
replace it when the objective of the study requires inclusion of time-invariant variable 
(dummy or categorical) in the model(Beck et al., 2013).  
                                (1) 
 
Where            being dependent variable is the primary unit of interest, and a 
representation of bank specific variable for a bank i at time period t.  At first we take 
several proxies of intermediation like asset growth, loan-deposit ratio, loan to earnings 
assets and gross loans growth and run regressions by considering each of them as  
           .  
Once and if the reintermediation is proved, we replace            with the CAMELS 
variables elaborated upon earlier to explore bank specific financial or non-financial 
characteristics acting as the probable reason of reintermediation by Islamic banks.  
To establish the reintermediation by Islamic banks, and to see how Islamic banks behave 
differently from conventional banks with reference to other CAMELS variables, we 
primarily rely on the Islamic bank dummy    , that takes the value of one for Islamic 
banks and zero otherwise.       is a vector of bank specific control variables, and      is a 
white-noise error term.  
In addition to running the baseline regression for our sample period 2004 – 2015, 
we run the model for post-crisis period only in order to analyze the characteristics of 
Islamic and conventional banks post GFC given the fact that Islamic financial institutions 
received extraordinary attention after the global financial crisis.  
3.2 Alternate Models 
Some past studies have shown that performance and other characteristics of 
Islamic banks are dependent on the country and/or the region they operate in. Yudistra 
(2004) finds that Islamic banks in the Middle East are less efficient than those operating 
outside the region. Mohamad et. al. (2008) find that Islamic banks in Turkey are more 
cost efficient than those operating in Africa. Abdul-Majid et. al. (2010) conclude that 
country effects have a significant impact on bank performance measures. Imam and 
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Kpodar (2010) find that country effects are important for the development of Islamic 
banks in a specific country: Islamic banks flourish more in oil exporting countries with a 
large Muslim population and a greater income per capita. 
Thus, the first alternate specification of the baseline model we run is according to 
income group classification of the countries. It is to see if the behavior of Islamic banks 
changes due to the fact how rich or poor the country of origination of the bank is. For this 
purpose, we divide our countries according to their income groups taken from World 
Bank country classification, which results into three income groups, high, upper middle 
and lower middle and we introduce the interaction terms between income group dummy 
and Islamic bank dummy to reach at equation 2.  
                                        (2) 
The coefficients    is the mean differential in bank specific variable(s) attributed only to 
the Islamic banks of countries that fall in a particular income group. It is important to 
note that the interaction of bank’s type (Islamic vs Conventional) and the income group 
of country of origination (High, Upper Middle and Lower Middle) would yield six 
categories in total. As we want to capture the differential behavior of Islamic banks 
operating in the countries falling into different income groups, we keep only three 
categories related to Islamic banks in different regions and drop the remaining three 
categories of commercial banks so that their mean value would be encapsulated in the 
intercept term. The intercept would then be used as base group to estimate differential 
dummy coefficient of Islamic banks falling into three income groups.  
Secondly, in order to explore further the differences in Islamic and conventional 
banks which are country specific in nature we introduce the interaction terms between 
each country dummy and IB, the dummy for Islamic bank to get to equation 3.  
                                        (3) 
 The coefficients    is the incremental value of specific variable(s) associated with 
Islamic banks in a particular country (j) for all countries included in our sample. Similar 
to the equation 2, intercept in equation 3 represents the mean value of specific variable(s) 
for commercial banks.  
  It is important to note that in equation 2 and 3, we drop the standalone Islamic 
bank dummy and focuses only on interaction terms to explore the behavior of Islamic 
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banks either in a particular country or in a country with some specific income group. In 
all equations the differential behavior of Islamic banks has been explored through dummy 
coefficients with reference to the intercept (   ) which is the mean value of the variable of 
interest associated with the “global average conventional bank” for the selected time 
period.   
 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our dataset. Although the winsorization of 
data excluded large outliers from our analysis, this table shows the presence of some 
small outliers in the dataset. For example, assets growth ranges from 50.35 to -24.69, 
which is a considerably large range. Similarly, the loan-deposit ratio ranges from 218.21 
per cent, to less than 20 per cent, which is 18.82. However, we believe that this variation 
enables our dataset to be a representative sample of the banks in selected countries. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 The Satterthwaite-Welch t-test shows that there is a significant difference between 
the means of measures across the two categories of banks, except for measures of asset 
quality, earnings quality, liquidity, and service quality. The finding that there is no 
statistically significant difference between asset quality, earnings quality and liquidity of 
conventional versus Islamic banks is supported by the literature (Bader et al., 2008; Beck 
et al., 2013). However, the observation that there is no statistically significant difference 
in service quality of the two categories of banks provides us with an interesting insight 
before we run our regression: perhaps, better service quality forms the very essence of 
today’s service-oriented banking sector activity, and hence it is not only Islamic banks 
which are trying to improve their performance over this dimension, but it is possible that 
conventional banks are doing the same. 
 
4.2 Baseline Regressions 
Table 3 presents results for the baseline regressions. It compares Islamic and 
conventional banks on the selected measures while controlling for bank characteristics. 
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At the one percent significance level9, the Islamic bank dummy is significant in 11 out of 
the 16 regressions. The results tilt towards the idea that there is a significant difference 
between Islamic and conventional banks not only vis-à-vis intermediation ratios, but that 
these two types also differ with respect to the various measures studied to explain these 
reintermediation trends. To be precise, the Islamic bank dummy is positive and 
significant for all 4 measures of intermediation (column 1-4), which indicates high 
financial intermediation services being performed by these banks. However, among the 
CAMELS variables that might explain these high intermediation ratios, is the positive 
and significant Islamic dummy for capital ratios (column 7-8), management costs 
(Column 11), and liquidity (column 15), whereas significantly negative Islamic dummy 
for asset quality (Column 9-10), earning (column 13-14) and service quality (column 16). 
The R-squared for most panel regressions is high but it is the highest when a measure of 
service quality, that is the employee-deposit ratio, is included as a dependent variable. 
This result opposes what was seen with the raw data in the descriptive statistics. This 
suggests that when we control for non-lending business and other bank characteristics, 
and focus only on the lending business of banks, a significant difference can be seen 
between the service quality of the two categories of banks. Controlling for non-lending 
business also establishes our aim of explaining the lending behavioral differences 
between the two categories of banks based on intermediation, asset quality, capital 
adequacy, management efficiency, liquidity and/or earnings quality. 
However, our main objective is to test different financial and non-financial 
aspects that either help Islamic banks in conducting activities pertaining to intermediation 
more vigorously or convince customers to prefer Islamic banks because they are more 
stable, better capitalized, liquid, efficient, profitable, and/or their service quality is better 
than conventional banks. From the results in Table 3, we can conclude at this point that 
various bank specific characteristics that may have enabled Islamic banks to emerge as an 
important player of reintermediated financial markets are better capital adequacy, better 
liquid assets ratio and better quality service, as compared to their conventional 
counterparts. In order to compete with conventional banks, Islamic banks would have to 
improve on their earnings quality and business orientation, those aspects in which 
                                                             
9 All analysis below is also based assuming a one percent significance level. 
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conventional banks are significantly better off than Islamic banks, as well as improve 
their management efficiency and asset quality, those aspects on which one cannot yet 
differentiate between the two categories of banks. Although we do believe that these 
results signify Islamic banks as important player of reintermediated financial markets, it 
will only be after these further steps that one would be able to say that Islamic banks have 
emerged as a competitive force for conventional banks. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 Recent literature has also established that banks that have higher non-lending 
activities present a higher level of risk than banks that mainly perform traditional 
intermediation activities (Mercieca et al., 2006). Moreover, risk is mainly positively 
correlated with the share of fee-based activities but not with trading activities (Lepetit et 
al., 2014). If fee-income ratio is considered a proxy for non-lending activities yielding no 
interest income, this finding is reiterated in our results. When fee-income ratio is used as 
a dependent variable, the Islamic bank dummy is significant and its sign is negative. This 
shows that Islamic banks have significantly lower non-interest income and/or fee-based 
income than conventional banks, and hence can be said to be more stable and more 
intermediated.  
 
4.3 Islamic Banks Post GFC 
The length of the time period in our sample provides us with an opportunity to analyze 
banks in the post-crisis period. Islamic banks received a lot of attention among academics 
during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, as they were believed to demonstrate more 
stability during the crisis as compared to their conventional counterparts (Beck et al., 
2013; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). However, as identified in the introduction of 
this study, most of the research was restricted to studying the performance of Islamic 
banks during the crisis (Abedifar et al., 2015). We found it crucial to study whether 
Islamic banks continued to remain stable and have high intermediation ratios after the 
end of the crisis as it can support our reintermediation hypothesis by showing consistent 
high intermediation services. Therefore, our first robustness check was to run the 
regressions again by restricting the time period of the sample from 2010 to 2015, which 
we define as the post crisis period. 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 presents the results of this analysis. These results are qualitatively similar 
to those for our baseline regressions, barring few exceptions that offer interesting insights 
about how the banking industry is reshaped during post-crisis period.  
The most important thing to note is the significant increase in the intercept terms 
for the first four regressions primarily looking at the intermediation variables. As the 
intercept portrays the mean value of the variable concerned for a global average 
conventional bank, this increase suggests that conventional banks fight back and start 
regaining their market share in the lending activities previously lost to Islamic banks or 
other financial market players. Contrary to that no such claim can be made for Islamic 
banks as the results of Islamic Bank dummy in intermediation regressions, are primarily 
unchanged in post-crisis period. This reincarnation of conventional banks can also be 
confirmed from the intercept of fee income ratio which almost vanished during post-crisis 
period suggesting reduced reliance of conventional banks on non-lending activities, a 
journey back to the intermediation. Another point to ponder is the Islamic bank dummy is 
insignificant in the total capital ratio regression for the post crisis period, though this was 
significant in the full sample regressions. This can be due to more stringent capital 
requirements imposed on banks after the crisis, due to which capital ratios of banks could 
be expected to converge to similar levels, regardless of the categories of banks. Even 
before the crisis, it was acknowledged that high capital levels are associated with lower 
bankruptcy risks (Santos, 2001). It can also be observed that the banking business 
becomes costlier for all banks, conventional or Islamic, as suggested by the increase in 
both intercept and Islamic dummy. The percentage change (increase) in cost for Islamic 
banks is however significantly greater than for conventional banks during post crisis 
period. This finding is in line with the literature that states that Islamic banks have been, 
and continue to be cost inefficient, as their Shariah compliance process subjects them to 
additional layers of operating procedures (Abedifar et al., 2015). However, a contrasting 
argument is that if this was the case before the crisis, why was no significant difference 
reported among the cost-income ratios of conventional and Islamic banks before the 
crisis. An explanation for this can be that perhaps after facing a tough time during the 
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crisis, conventional banks innovated and made cost-cutting a regular practice. However, 
this assertion will have to be checked further in future research. It is also evident that 
both conventional and Islamic banks started taking liquidity position more seriously as 
there is a significant improvement in liquidity ratios for both categories of banks post-
crisis. This response might also be the outcome of the stringent capital requirement 
imposed by the regulators dealing exclusively with the liquidity position of banks. And 
finally there seems to be an improvement in service quality of both categories of banks in 
order to regain the confidence of customers shattered badly due to the crisis.  
 
4.4 Islamic Banks vis-a-vis Income Group of Country 
Table 5 presents results of another robustness check, where we divide the countries in our 
sample into three income groups, according to their World Bank income classifications, 
and re-run the analysis. This is motivated by the observation that recent literature on 
Islamic banks has advocated modeling cross-country bank cost and profit efficiency 
(Abedifar et al., 2015). However, the results have been mixed in this stream of research. 
For example, Mohamad et al., (2008) find no significant differences between cost, profit 
and revenue efficiency of Islamic versus conventional banks in their cross-country 
analysis, while (Johnes et al., 2009) find that Islamic banks are significantly less efficient 
than their conventional counterparts during a methodologically similar study. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results in Table 5 highlight the differences in intermediation ratios and 
CAMELS measures across income group classifications. The findings show that as the 
economic situation of a country worsens, differences between Islamic and conventional 
banks become obscure. This could be because both categories of banks face certain 
political, foreign exchange, interest rate and regulatory risks in countries whose 
economics are not stable. Hence, the major objective of banks in these countries becomes 
economic risk management instead of focusing on asset quality and other such objectives. 
This finding is especially true for intermediation ratios, which represent one of the main 
objectives of this paper. For high income countries, a significant difference exists 
between Islamic and conventional banks for 3 out of 4 measures of intermediation. The 
Islamic banking dummy is positive and significant for the assets growth, loan to deposits 
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ratio and gross loans growth regressions. This high level of intermediation in high income 
countries is explained by the corresponding coefficients in the CAMELS regressions 
showing better cost efficiency, asset quality, liquidity, and high capitalization in the case 
for Islamic banks. Contrastingly, lower middle income countries report no significant 
coefficients for intermediation, with the exception of the assets growth regression that 
reports a positive and significant coefficient. Although the assets of Islamic banks appear 
to have grown, this cannot be attributed to loan growth, as their coefficients are 
insignificant and we cannot conclude that intermediation has increased. The lack of 
intermediation can be owed to the low capital adequacy, asset quality, high management 
costs and low liquidity shown in corresponding coefficients in the CAMELS regressions. 
For upper middle income countries, however, no real effect of intermediation can be 
found and no trends emerge in the CAMELS regressions. 
 For the results displayed in Table 6, we run the regressions based on income 
groups but now restrict the time period to 2010 to 2015, that is, for the post crisis period. 
However, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5. High income 
countries still have high intermediation levels in the post crisis period. One important 
change appears to have occurred in the earning quality of Islamic banks, which is 
negative. However, management costs have also risen in the post crisis period, which 
may have depressed the true values for earning quality in the regressions. In the case of 
lower middle income countries, lending has increased, but through non deposit sources of 
funding. This is represented by the positive Islamic dummy coefficients for gross loans 
growth and loans to earning assets regressions. The negative coefficient of the Islamic 
banking dummy in the loans to deposits ratio is explained by the poor capitalization, low 
asset quality, high management costs and low liquidity for banks in these countries. 
Although the return on equity has risen immensely for these countries, this is not due to 
better earning quality, and possibly due to the higher risk after the crisis and the demand 
of equity holders to receive higher returns. Finally, upper middle income countries have a 
very positive and significant Islamic dummy coefficient for one out of four 
intermediation regressions. The coefficient for loans to earning assets regression is highly 
positive and significant, while the corresponding coefficient in the gross loans growth 
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regression is negative. It appears that earning assets have decreased more than the fall in 
gross loans growth, and reintermediation has not actually occurred in these countries. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.5 Islamic Banks at Country Level 
In addition to controlling for income groups, we find it important to model for cross-
country variations because of the differing types and levels of risk inherent in the banking 
business for different economies. This intuition is supported by findings in recent 
literature as for example, while comparing Islamic and conventional banks, Abdul-Majid 
et al., (2010) concluded that country effects have a significant impact on efficiency 
differentials. Imam and Kpodar, (2010) and Abedifar et al., (2015) emphasize that cross-
country analysis is vital while studying Islamic banking characteristics. This is true in our 
sample too, as we find a lot of cross-country variation in intermediation trends and their 
possible drivers. Table 7 displays regression results for each country used in this sample, 
and we find that not all countries have experienced high intermediation in Islamic banks. 
For Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan and Syria, the coefficients are negative for several 
regressions: Islamic banks in these countries significantly underperform conventional 
banks, with respect to the CAMELS measures used. For instance, with the exception of 
Pakistan, the coefficient of the Islamic dummy in the service quality regression is 
negative. For a dual banking system economy such as Malaysia, this is a counterintuitive 
result as Islamic banks in such a country could be expected to provide superior service 
quality to their customers, owing to legislative and regulatory benefits.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
However, of the countries that do report high intermediation levels, we note that the 
roles of the CAMELS variables in explaining banking performance are not consistent 
across countries. Interestingly, two of the CAMELS variables do emerge as key 
explanatory components for high intermediation. These are ‘capital adequacy’, proxied 
by the total capital ratio, and ‘liquidity’, proxied by the liquid assets ratio. With the 
exception of Qatar in the case of the liquidity regression, and Kenya and Bangladesh in 
the total capital ratio regression, all countries that reported high intermediation for 
Islamic banks also had better capitalized and more liquid banks. Additionally, the lack of 
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these two strengths also appears to have contributed to low intermediation levels reported 
in other countries in the sample. Earlier, these two variables were found to be highly 
significant in explaining intermediation on the global scale, as displayed in the baseline 
regressions in Table 3. This helps us conclude that capital adequacy and liquidity are the 
two prominent drivers of reintermediation in the global banking sector, and are robust to 
cross-country variations. 
5 Conclusion 
Conventional banks which once were competing with non-banking financial institutions 
and capital market today face the new challenge of being reintermediated by Islamic 
banks. Earlier academic research has been debating over disintermediation and 
reintermediation of conventional banks, but consistently failed to address 
reintermediation through Islamic banks as a possibility. This study therefore addresses 
this novel possibility that is the reintermediation within the banking sector. Moreover, the 
literature that has barely touched upon the intermediation in Islamic and conventional 
banks has focused only the recent Global Financial Crisis, and resultantly fails to explain 
overall reintermediation trends in the global system. This study also fills this large gap in 
the literature and is the first to our knowledge to analyzes and compares Islamic and 
conventional banks from the perspective of reintermediated financial markets. 
The analysis evaluates the trends in the growth of banks’ assets and loans, loan to 
deposit ratio, and loans as a ratio of total earning asset for both conventional and Islamic 
banks; and thus identifies the intermediation patterns within the banking sector. Another 
important contribution of this study is that it uses several bank specific financial and non-
financial characteristics that might have enabled Islamic banks to emerge as an important 
player in reintermediated financial markets. Specifically, the business model of Islamic 
and conventional banks is analyzed using the CAMELS framework where various known 
ratios have been used to proxy the components of CAMELS. A slight variation in the 
model, however, is the replacement of “Sensitivity to Market Risk” in the CAMELS 
framework with “Service Quality”. We believe this variable is important in explaining 
the performance of banks as they belong to a service oriented industry. By bringing the 
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customers’ perspective into analysis, another major contribution is made in the research 
regarding banking sector activity. 
The findings help conclude the existence of reintermediation trends “within” the 
global banking sector and the results are robust to different regressions specifications. 
Islamic banks showed high intermediation ratios as compared to conventional banks for 
the entire sample period; and among the CAMELS variables, better capitalization and 
liquidity stood out as plausible drivers for this trend. The analysis for only post GFC also 
helped us capture some interesting reintermediation trends in recent years. For example, 
after crisis, service quality appeared to have improved in the case of both Islamic and 
conventional banks, which probably could be the outcome of lost business and market 
share during GFC times forcing these banks to care more for the customers. The 
increased global attention on the financial system and lack of decency in relation to 
customers after the GFC is highlighted by Belás (2013), who also states the importance 
of customer satisfaction for commercial banks. Moreover, conventional banks appeared 
to be more reliant on lending activities, hinting at comparatively higher intermediation in 
their case after the recent crisis. When income effects are accounted for by categorizing 
countries into different income groups, it appeared to have impact on the intermediation 
ratios and trends in CAMELS variables.  For example, Islamic banks in high-income 
countries performed high intermediation services; and attached with this high lending 
business was the high quality of their asset, low cost and better liquidity and 
capitalization condition. Contrarily, Islamic banks in lower income countries showed low 
intermediation services which were linked with their poor asset quality, high cost, low 
liquidity and low capitalization. These two results support our earlier inference about the 
possible drivers of high intermediation services which are at least the better liquidity and 
high capitalization. Lastly, cross-country variations are identified when the analysis is 
carried out separately for each country in the analysis. It is interesting to highlight that 
even with cross-country variations in intermediation trends, we were still able to identify 
that the countries in which Islamic banks showed high intermediation ratios, had high 
liquidity and were better capitalized; and the reverse was true for countries which 
experienced less intermediation by Islamic banks; thus making liquidity and 
capitalization the important drivers for intermediation. 
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Towards the end, this study links two important streams of literature in banking 
and financial markets: reintermediation, and the performance comparison between 
Islamic and conventional banks. Based on our initial hypothesis, our results prove that 
conventional banks, once the major player in financial market; and were competing with 
the capital market and NBFIs, could become substitutable by their new competitor 
because of their better liquidity and high capitalization; and this presents reintermediation 
within the global banking sector.  The idea of Islamic banks replacing conventional banks 
however, is not put forth as an immediate event, but a likely upcoming possibility. 
Moreover, the idea neither excludes the challenges posed to conventional banks by other 
sources (e.g., FIN TECH) which are paving the path for a term now growing in 
prominence, “Cybermediation”10, nor the challenges by the already existing players (e.g., 
NBFIs, capital market) to the overall global banking sector.  
 
  
                                                             
10 Cybermediation (http://www.jamieparfitt.com/blog/2014/5/4/disintermediation-
reintermediation-and-cybermediation) 
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Table 1  
Structure of Banking Sector in Sample 
 
Country Income Group Bank Type Listing Total 
  Conventional Islamic Delisted Listed Unlisted  
Bahrain High 10 (35.71%) 18 (65.29%) 0 (0.00%) 11 (1.69%) 17 (2.61%) 28 
Bangladesh Lower Middle 40 (83.33%) 8 (16.67%) 0 (0.00%) 30 (4.60%) 18 (2.76%) 48 
Brunei* NA 0 (0.00%) 1 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.15%) 1 
Egypt Lower Middle 23 (88.46%) 3 (11.54%) 10 (1.53%) 10 (1.53%) 6 (0.92%) 26 
Indonesia Lower Middle 91 (90.10%) 10 (9.90%) 2 (0.31%) 40 (6.31%) 59 (9.05%) 101 
Iraq Upper Middle 8 (53.33%) 7 (46.67%) 0 (0.00%) 10 (1.53%) 5 (0.77%) 15 
Iran Upper Middle 1 (5.88%) 16 (94.12%) 0 (0.00%) 7 (1.07%) 10 (1.53%) 17 
Jordan Upper Middle 11 (78.57%) 3 (21.43%) 0 (0.00%) 12 (1.84%) 2 (0.31%) 14 
Kenya Lower Middle 32 (94.12%) 2 (5.88%) 0 (0.00%) 7 (1.07%) 27 (4.14%) 34 
Kuwait High  5 (38.46%) 8 (61.54%) 0 (0.00%) 12 (1.84%) 1 (0.15%) 13 
Lebanon* NA 0 (0.00%) 1 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.15%) 1 
Malaysia Upper Middle 33 (64.71%) 18 (35.29%) 0 (0.00%) 4 (0.61%) 47 (7.21%) 51 
Maldives* NA 0 (0.00%) 1 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.15%) 1 
Mauritania* NA 0 (0.00%) 1 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.15%) 1 
Nigeria* NA 0 (0.00%) 1 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.15%) 1 
Oman High  6 (75.00%) 2 (25.00%) 0 (0.00%) 6 (0.92%) 2 (0.31%) 8 
Pakistan Lower Middle 22 (73.33%) 8 (26.67%) 0 (0.00) 25 (3.83%) 5 (0.77%) 30 
Palestine Lower Middle 3 (60.00%) 2 (40.00%) 0 (0.00) 3 (0.46%) 2 (0.31%) 5 
Philippines* NA 0 (0.00%) 1 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.15%) 1 
Qatar High  7 (58.33%) 5 (41.67%) 0 (0.00%) 8 (1.23%) 4 (0.61%) 12 
Saudi Arabia High  8 (61.54%) 5 (38.46%) 0 (0.00%) 12 (1.84%) 1 (0.15%) 13 
Senegal* NA 0 (0.00%) 1 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.15%) 1 
Singapore* NA 0 (0.00%) 1 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.15%) 1 
South Africa* NA 0 (0.00%) 1 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.15%) 1 
Sudan Lower Middle 3 (17.65%) 14 (82.35%) 0 (0.00%) 9 (1.38%) 8 (1.23%) 17 
Syria Lower Middle 9 (81.82%) 2 (18.18%) 0 (0.00%) 9 (1.38%) 2 (0.31%) 11 
Thailand* NA 0 (0.00%) 1 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.15%) 1 
Tunisia* NA 0 (0.00%) 1 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.15%) 1 
Turkey Upper Middle 34 (87.18%) 5 (12.82%) 2 (0.31%) 12 (1.84%) 25 (3.83%) 39 
UAE High  19 (65.52%) 10 (34.48%) 2 (0.31%) 20 (3.07%) 7 (1.07%) 29 
UK High  117 (96.69%) 4 (3.31%) 6 (0.92%) 3 (0.46%) 112 (17.18%) 121 
Tanzania* NA 0 (0.00%) 1 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.15%) 1 
Yemen Lower Middle 4 (50.00%) 4 (50.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 8 (1.23%) 8 
Total  486 166 22 250 380 652 
Note: Table 1 provides an overview of the banking sector in the countries included in our sample. The banks comprise conventional 
and Islamic banks, which are categorised as listed, unlisted and delisted. The countries in the sample are classified into different 
income groups: High, Upper Middle and Lower Middle as per the World Bank classifications. 
The countries marked with * are those which were excluded from analysis as they had only one Islamic bank. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Estimation  Mean Median  Max Min.  Std. 
Dev. 
 Obs. Conv. 
Mean 
Islamic 
Mean 
Satterthwaite
-Welch t-
test* 
Intermediation 
Assets Growth y-o-y growth of log of Assets 10.7672 9.4686 50.3455 -24.6895 18.6427 4432 10.2938 12.3209 0.0028 
Loan-Deposit 
Ratio 
Loans / Customer Deposits 89.4549 84.2450 218.2095 18.8245 45.6967 4404 87.5896 96.0585 0.0000 
Loan to Earning 
Assets 
Gross Loans / Total Earning 
Assets 
60.2520 65.4719 93.6864 9.7556 23.6064 4759 59.4129 63.0499 0.0000 
Gross Loan 
Growth 
y-o-y growth of log of Gross 
Loans 
13.1376 11.2911 66.8395 -30.7993 23.2325 4276 12.4086 15.6486 0.0005 
Business Orientation 
Fee Income Ratio Fee Income / Total Operating 
Income 
17.6575 15.9325 50.8078 0.6186 12.3184 4539 18.1588 15.8696 0.0000 
Non-deposit 
Lending Ratio 
Long Term Funding / Total 
Funding 
9.3235 4.2606 48.4730 0.0000 12.8723 2842 7.9848 15.7336 0.0000 
Capital Adequacy 
Equity Ratio Equity / Total Assets 16.8036 12.3066 56.2908 3.9386 13.3750 4893 15.2878 21.6818 0.0000 
Total Capital 
Ratio 
Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital / Risk-
weighted assets 
21.0940 17.3300 53.0770 10.5000 10.7990 3378 20.6096 22.9845 0.0000 
Asset Quality 
Loan Loss 
Reserves Ratio 
Loan Loss Reserves / Gross 
Loans 
4.6947 2.7870 24.5664 0.3877 5.6047 4205 4.6441 4.8854 0.2639 
Non-Performing 
Loans Ratio 
Non-Performing Loans / 
Gross Loans 
6.5518 3.5650 33.8100 0.3400 7.9661 3310 6.5300 6.6560 0.7380 
Management 
Cost to Income 
Ratio 
Overheads/ (Net Interest 
Revenue + Other Operating 
Income) 
57.0241 52.9135 107.6086 24.0292 22.7569 4754 56.2634 59.5038 0.0001 
Overheads Ratio Overheads / Total Assets 2.8026 2.3154 7.5918 0.7280 1.8426 4835 2.6939 3.1487 0.0000 
Earning Quality 
ROAE Net income/ Average Equity  10.2776 10.1480 31.4840 -10.9750 10.2225 4874 10.4819 9.6229 0.0142 
ROAA Net Income / Average Assets 1.3261 1.1760 4.4516 -1.8693 1.4859 4878 1.3051 1.3934 0.1143 
Liquidity 
Liquid Assets 
Ratio 
Liquid Assets / Total 
Deposits and Borrowings 
39.8927 29.0150 121.5568 8.5908 31.3267 4725 39.5515 41.0278 0.2021 
Service Quality 
Employee-
Deposit Ratio 
Number of Employees / 
Customer Deposits 
28.0814 4.8953 26874.540
0 
0.0009 546.954 2566 27.8591 29.2535 0.9278 
Control 
Total Assets Log of Total Assets 14.4758 14.3969 17.8557 11.1482 1.8992 4893 14.5275 14.3093 0.0005 
Fixed Asset Ratio Fixed Assets / Total Assets 1.6069 1.0865 5.8821 0.0536 1.5695 4752 1.4103 2.2364 0.0000 
Non-lending 
Asset Ratio 
Other Earning Assets / Total 
Assets 
39.7777 34.5281 90.6080 6.5397 23.6306 4759 40.6118 36.9968 0.0000 
*Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Note: Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the range of variables used in the regression analysis for this study. The 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test is used to establish whether there is a statistically significant difference between the mean values of the 
measures of Islamic and conventional banks. 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Intermediation and Variables Explaining Reintermediation between Islamic and Conventional Banks - Controlling for Bank Characteristics 
for Sample Period 2004 - 2015 
Table 3 Base Case 
Intermediation and Variables Explaining Reintermediation between Islamic and Conventional Banks - Controlling for Bank Characteristics for Sample Period 2004 – 2015 
 Intermediation Business orientation and Capital adequacy Asset Quality Management Earning Quality Liquidity Service 
quality 
Variable Assets 
Growth 
Loan-
deposit 
Ratio 
Loan to 
Earning 
Assets 
Gross 
Loans 
Growth 
Fee Income 
Ratio 
Non-deposit 
lending Ratio 
Equity 
Ratio 
Total 
Capital 
Ratio 
Loan Loss 
Reserves 
Ratio 
Non-
Performing 
Loans Ratio 
Cost to 
Income 
Overheads 
Ratio 
ROAE ROAA Liquid 
Assets Ratio 
Employee-
Deposit 
Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
C 19.61589**
* 
87.6433*** 27.3758*** 29.9455*** 6.9165*** 8.0978*** 37.3323*** 35.4654*** 2.8778*** 9.0846*** 88.4879*** 6.0160*** -4.3499*** 1.0866*** 39.7447*** 32.8882*** 
 (3.6808) (3.2619) (1.4127) (4.6939) (1.0085) (1.4664) (0.5407) (0.4106) (0.3508) (0.5118) (0.9510) (0.0562) (0.6318) (0.1044) (1.4054) (0.6878) 
Islamic 
dummy 
1.845259** 2.4315*** 4.8941*** 1.7897** -2.6439*** 5.6252*** 3.1361*** 0.8683*** -0.0930* -0.4456*** 1.3150** -0.0315 -1.0531*** -0.1001*** 1.7228*** -1.4861*** 
 (0.7893) (0.5205) (0.5567) (0.8218) (0.0893) (0.4391) (0.1019) (0.2298) (0.0504) (0.1179) (0.5716) (0.0221) (0.1822) (0.0327) (0.2177) (0.2390) 
Ln (Total 
assets) 
-0.5666** 1.8913*** 2.2147*** -1.0195*** 0.5603*** -0.2479** -1.8002*** -1.4041*** -
0.0859*** 
-0.4965*** -2.6753*** -0.2567*** 1.1288*** 0.0213*** -2.1531*** -1.7006*** 
 (0.2468) (0.2195) (0.0792) (0.3173) (0.0635) (0.1030) (0.0343) (0.0364) (0.0219) (0.0278) (0.0752) (0.0030) (0.0361) (0.0044) (0.0890) (0.0360) 
Fixed 
Assets  
0.2516 -1.8779*** 0.9475*** 0.0252 0.0524 0.1277 0.7717*** 0.1529* 0.6676*** 1.2994*** 1.9723*** 0.3700*** 0.1738*** 0.0659*** 0.3176* 2.6871*** 
 (0.1692) (0.2207) (0.2199) (0.2344) (0.0923) (0.1276) (0.0539) (0.0886) (0.0319) (0.0938) (0.1531) (0.0085) (0.0605) (0.0080) (0.1708) (0.0721) 
Non-
lending 
assets 
-0.0304 -0.7908***  -0.0740*** 0.0558*** 0.0385*** 0.0381*** 0.1255*** 0.0320*** 0.0562*** 0.0723*** -0.0064*** -0.0441*** -0.0060*** 0.7300*** -0.0698*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0155)  (0.0142) (0.0066) (0.0132) (0.0043) (0.0082) (0.0022) (0.0064) (0.0147) (0.0004) (0.0062) (0.0009) (0.0090) (0.0029) 
                 Obs. 4229 4348 4652 4186 4353 2771 4652 3304 4150 3284 4554 4613 4640 4643 4567 2497 
Cross 
Sections 
602 575 605 602 591 427 605 487 566 486 603 604 605 605 599 431 
R-Sq. 0.0173 0.5436 0.1295 0.0397 0.1237 0.1259 0.5864 0.3750 0.2486 0.4423 0.4398 0.6219 0.2026 0.0595 0.6792 0.7180 
Note: *** for p< .01; ** for p< .05; * for p< .10 
 
Note: Table 3 reports the results for the baseline regression run to identify trends of reintermediation in the global banking market.  As can be seen by the significance of the 
Islamic banking dummy, the performance of Islamic banks is positive and significant in most cases, and Islamic banks are seen to be an important characteristic of the 
reintermediated international market.
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Table 4 
Intermediation and Variables Explaining Reintermediation between Islamic and Conventional Banks - Controlling for Bank 
Characteristics & Post Crisis Period 2010 – 2015 
Table 4 with Crisis 
Intermediation and Variables Explaining Reintermediation between Islamic and Conventional Banks - Controlling for Bank Characteristics & Post Crisis Period 2010 – 2015 
 Intermediation Business orientation and Capital adequacy Asset Quality Management Earning Quality Liquidity Service 
quality 
Variables Assets 
Growth 
Loan-
deposit 
Ratio 
Loan to 
Earning 
Assets 
Gross Loans 
Growth 
Fee Income 
Ratio 
Non-deposit 
lending 
Ratio 
Equity Ratio Total Capital 
Ratio 
Loan Loss 
Reserves 
Ratio 
Non-
Performing 
Loans Ratio 
Cost to 
Income 
Overheads 
Ratio 
ROAE ROAA Liquid 
Assets Ratio 
Employee-
Deposit 
Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
C 26.2054*** 102.6804*** 29.7539*** 35.5961*** 0.5107 16.6448*** 38.9457*** 36.6815*** 0.6143*** 6.1124*** 95.7034*** 6.3722*** -3.5319*** 0.5864*** 42.8246*** 38.8256*** 
 (1.8971) (2.7227) (1.9774) (2.4995) (0.3853) (1.3534) (0.7846) (0.3665) (0.1756) (0.5013) (1.1520) (0.0603) (0.6731) (0.0926) (0.9246) (0.4815) 
Islamic 
dummy 
0.6964 2.1132*** 5.1919*** 1.6606*** -2.0328*** 3.3233*** 2.7127*** 0.2680 0.1401** -0.3472*** 3.3137*** 0.0333 -1.1359*** -0.1747*** 2.7297*** -0.8020*** 
 (0.4612) (0.3988) (0.3751) (0.3301) (0.1235) (0.4443) (0.2687) (0.1667) (0.0549) (0.1129) (0.3753) (0.0258) (0.1803) (0.0229) (0.2192) (0.1169) 
Ln (Total 
assets) 
-1.0357*** 0.7902*** 2.2084*** -1.3922*** 0.8573*** -0.7311*** -1.9141*** -1.4200*** 0.0378*** -0.3604*** -3.1491*** -0.2820*** 1.0478*** 0.0491*** -2.2979*** -1.9850*** 
 (0.1440) (0.1687) (0.0930) (0.1288) (0.0228) (0.0700) (0.0478) (0.0231) (0.0072) (0.0301) (0.0796) (0.0039) (0.0304) (0.0032) (0.0620) (0.0235) 
Fixed 
Assets 
-0.0946 -2.3238*** 0.7709*** -0.3285 0.5826*** -0.1501 0.7050*** -0.2653*** 0.7310*** 1.5651*** 1.1892*** 0.3268*** 0.2947*** 0.1077*** -0.1781 2.1186*** 
 (0.0765) (0.2260) (0.2038) (0.2443) (0.0676) (0.0917) (0.0716) (0.0546) (0.0393) (0.0742) (0.0861) (0.0104) (0.0599) (0.0085) (0.1231) (0.0668) 
Non-
lending 
assets 
-0.0672*** -0.7362***  -0.1334*** 0.0588*** 0.0349*** 0.0603*** 0.1194*** 0.0436*** 0.0915*** 0.1347*** -0.0038*** -0.0704*** -0.0070*** 0.6895*** -0.0811*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0047)  (0.0110) (0.0029) (0.0082) (0.0039) (0.0092) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0100) (0.0004) (0.0056) (0.0009) (0.0058) (0.0017) 
Obs. 2710 2750 2945 2691 2803 1639 2945 2218 2697 2198 2901 2929 2938 2940 2892 1659 
Cross 
Sections 
597 566 600 597 585 392 600 474 562 474 597 599 600 600 593 388 
R-Square 0.1357 0.5829 0.2053 0.1217 0.2261 0.2040 0.6595 0.4465 0.3092 0.5342 0.4323 0.6818 0.3737 0.1884 0.7016 0.8079 
Note: *** for p< .01; ** for p< .05; * for p< .10 
Note: Table 4 shows the results for the first robustness check that is to run the baseline regressions by restricting the time period of the sample from 2010 to 
2015, which is defined as the post crisis period.  
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Table 5 
Intermediation and Variables Explaining Reintermediation between Islamic and Conventional Banks - Controlling for Income Group for 
Sample Period 2004 – 2015 
Table 5 
Comparing Islamic and Conventional Banks - Controlling for Bank Characteristics & Income Group 
 Intermediation Business orientation and Capital adequacy Asset Quality Management Earning Quality Liquidity Service 
quality 
Variables Assets 
Growth 
Loan-deposit 
Ratio 
Loan to 
Earning 
Assets 
Gross Loans 
Growth 
Fee Income 
Ratio 
Non-deposit 
lending 
Ratio 
Equity Ratio Total Capital 
Ratio 
Loan Loss 
Reserves 
Ratio 
Non-
Performing 
Loans Ratio 
Cost to 
Income 
Overheads 
Ratio 
ROAE ROAA Liquid 
Assets Ratio 
Employee-
Deposit 
Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Constant 20.1413*** 88.8333*** 31.1863*** 30.3613*** 5.4456*** 5.1606*** 41.1030*** 37.9219*** 3.1166*** 8.8546*** 88.8213*** 5.9389*** -4.1838*** 1.0129*** 43.0929*** 29.9465*** 
 (3.7515) (3.4012) (1.2121) (4.5376) (1.0376) (1.2111) (0.5161) (0.3889) (0.3725) (0.5385) (0.9691) (0.0673) (1.0080) (0.1283) (1.7015) (0.6498) 
High 
Income & 
Islamic 
3.8060*** 7.1333*** -1.4501 4.4889*** -3.3428*** 2.5970*** 9.7113*** 3.8694*** 0.2093*** -0.8307*** -1.2838 -0.0299 -3.7303*** 0.0904 2.0091*** -4.1240*** 
 (1.0360) (0.5640) (0.9202) (1.1873) (0.3660) (0.4570) (0.5427) (0.2861) (0.0739) (0.1611) (1.2772) (0.0335) (0.6706) (0.1349) (0.2592) (0.1615) 
Lower 
Middle & 
Islamic 
1.3011* 2.5623 -0.4199 0.6182 -0.9099** 13.3324*** -3.0568*** -2.7744*** -0.7195*** 0.6687 0.2216 0.1293*** 1.6640*** -0.0674 -1.0129** 5.7153*** 
 (0.7434) (1.9902) (0.9005) (0.7304) (0.4319) (0.9918) (0.2457) (0.3430) (0.0815) (0.4180) (0.7266) (0.0315) (0.3636) (0.0427) (0.4164) (0.3328) 
Upper 
Middle & 
Islamic 
0.0395 -2.4334** 15.2793*** -1.0769 -3.3552*** -0.2219 0.6267*** 0.1475 -0.1004 -0.6023*** 3.8060*** -0.2955*** -0.8107*** -0.2590*** 7.2818*** -4.5491*** 
 (1.6853) (1.1925) (0.7160) (2.1694) (0.2265) (0.3516) (0.2186) (0.1822) (0.1039) (0.0998) (0.5337) (0.0433) (0.2470) (0.0281) (0.6214) (0.1731) 
Ln (Total 
assets) 
-0.6041** 1.8283*** 1.9561*** -1.0520*** 0.6533*** -0.0175 -2.0426*** -1.5448*** -0.1043*** -0.4810*** -2.7112*** -0.2486*** 1.1251*** 0.0278*** -2.3841*** -1.4835*** 
 (0.2442) (0.2347) (0.0888) (0.3122) (0.0621) (0.0813) (0.0342) (0.0301) (0.0221) (0.0293) (0.0771) (0.0037) (0.0517) (0.0061) (0.1039) (0.0333) 
Fixed 
Assets 
0.3008* -1.9176*** 0.9487*** 0.0808 0.1243 0.2446** 0.7727*** 0.0459 0.6646*** 1.2929*** 1.9981*** 0.3746*** 0.1515** 0.0624*** 0.0429 2.5392*** 
 (0.1773) (0.2276) (0.1676) (0.2333) (0.0921) (0.1026) (0.0478) (0.0805) (0.0273) (0.0920) (0.1516) (0.0087) (0.0668) (0.0082) (0.2055) (0.0502) 
Non-
lending 
assets 
-0.0318 -0.7965***  -0.0745*** 0.0542*** 0.0141 0.0368*** 0.1210*** 0.0332*** 0.0559*** 0.0773*** -0.0075*** -0.0469*** -0.0063*** 0.7374*** -0.0744*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0156)  (0.0124) (0.0054) (0.0091) (0.0025) (0.0077) (0.0025) (0.0065) (0.0147) (0.0004) (0.0065) (0.0008) (0.0093) (0.0027) 
                 Obs. 4229 4348 4652 4186 4353 2771 4652 3304 4150 3284 4554 4613 4640 4643 4567 2497 
Cross 
Sections 
602 575 605 602 591 427 605 487 566 486 603 604 605 605 599 431 
R-Square 0.0210 0.5467 0.2561 0.0425 0.1333 0.0906 0.6168 0.4186 0.2569 0.4496 0.4413 0.6190 0.2706 0.0798 0.6675 0.7697 
Note: Table 5 presents results where the countries in the sample are divided into three income groups according to their World Bank income classifications. This is to identify cross 
country income group effects on bank performance and reintermediation in these markets. 
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Table 6 
Intermediation and Variables Explaining Reintermediation between Islamic and Conventional Banks - Controlling for Income Group & 
Post Crisis Period 2010 – 2015 
 
Table 6 With Income Post Crisis 
Intermediation and Variables Explaining Reintermediation between Islamic and Conventional Banks - Controlling for Bank Characteristics, Income Groups & Post Crisis Period 2010 - 2015 
 Intermediation Business orientation and Capital adequacy Asset Quality Management Earning Quality Liquidity Service 
quality 
Variables Assets 
Growth 
Loan-deposit 
Ratio 
Loan to 
Earning 
Assets 
Gross Loans 
Growth 
Fee 
Income 
Ratio 
Non-deposit 
lending Ratio 
Equity 
Ratio 
Total 
Capital 
Ratio 
Loan Loss 
Reserves 
Ratio 
Non-
Performing 
Loans Ratio 
Cost to 
Income 
Overheads 
Ratio 
ROAE ROAA Liquid 
Assets Ratio 
Employee-
Deposit 
Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Constant 26.1474*** 106.8407*** 29.6676*** 36.6084*** -0.2254 15.9954*** 43.4673*** 39.8224*** 0.7235*** 5.6074*** 97.0907*** 6.3736*** -5.6534*** 0.4457*** 47.0750*** 34.8206*** 
 (1.9310) (2.5026) (1.6540) (2.1270) (0.4285) (1.2185) (0.5715) (0.4384) (0.1776) (0.4345) (1.2975) (0.0738) (0.5689) (0.0683) (1.0839) (0.7497) 
High 
Income & 
Islamic 
2.4291*** 12.7163*** -4.2895*** 4.2326*** -
2.5035*** 
4.5687*** 8.4251*** 3.0731*** 0.4436*** -1.0167*** 4.5979*** 0.0889** -5.1674*** -
0.3560*** 
2.9315*** -4.2949*** 
 (0.4553) (0.6117) (0.6094) (0.6324) (0.3717) (0.3842) (0.2879) (0.3106) (0.1468) (0.1091) (0.5419) (0.0370) (0.4261) (0.0278) (0.2421) (0.1054) 
Lower 
Middle & 
Islamic 
-0.4675 -2.6005*** 2.0480*** 1.6774*** -0.6254 10.5551*** -4.2360*** -3.0544*** -
0.4009*** 
0.2388 0.7197 0.0804 2.2098*** 0.0265 -1.2836*** 4.9643*** 
 (0.7300) (0.9517) (0.3602) (0.3670) (0.3914) (1.8469) (0.2121) (0.2868) (0.0510) (0.3226) (0.8541) (0.0511) (0.3429) (0.0373) (0.3847) (0.2928) 
Upper 
Middle & 
Islamic 
-1.7184 -0.4298 15.3776*** -3.0610 -
2.1969*** 
-1.1868*** 1.2145*** -0.1629 0.2704** -0.4208*** 4.2151*** -0.1660*** -0.4483*** -
0.2426*** 
7.4664*** -4.9379*** 
 (1.1528) (0.5596) (0.7000) (2.0321) (0.1497) (0.2685) (0.1746) (0.1713) (0.1298) (0.1380) (0.6848) (0.0400) (0.1634) (0.0223) (0.6485) (0.2091) 
Ln (Total 
assets) 
-1.0274*** 0.5205*** 2.1894*** -1.4344*** 0.8936*** -0.6442*** -2.1926*** -1.6059*** 0.0268*** -0.3245*** -3.2617*** -0.2798*** 1.1733*** 0.0598*** -2.6108*** -1.7148*** 
 (0.1411) (0.1621) (0.0768) (0.1093) (0.0237) (0.0636) (0.0344) (0.0233) (0.0083) (0.0245) (0.0896) (0.0044) (0.0319) (0.0025) (0.0615) (0.0363) 
Fixed 
Assets 
-0.0524 -2.3118*** 1.0203*** -0.4133** 0.5483*** -0.2250*** 0.8816*** -0.2959*** 0.7540*** 1.5696*** 1.2355*** 0.3255*** 0.2895*** 0.0968*** -0.0129 2.1826*** 
 (0.0949) (0.2000) (0.1608) (0.2043) (0.0678) (0.0593) (0.0636) (0.0482) (0.0360) (0.0671) (0.0746) (0.0095) (0.0625) (0.0083) (0.2230) (0.0431) 
Non-
lending 
assets 
-0.0700*** -0.7354***  -0.1407*** 0.0659*** 0.0156* 0.0473*** 0.1123*** 0.0442*** 0.0891*** 0.1423*** -0.0045*** -0.0623*** -
0.0071*** 
0.7028*** -0.0860*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0065)  (0.0097) (0.0030) (0.0082) (0.0022) (0.1123) (0.0018) (0.0036) (0.0100) (0.0004) (0.0047) (0.0007) (0.0061) (0.0025) 
                 Obs. 2710) 2750 2945 2691 2803 1639 2945 2218 2697 2198 2901 2929 2938 2940 2892 1659 
Cross 
Sections 
597 566 600 597 585 392 600 474 562 474 597 599 600 600 593 388 
R-Square 0.1489 0.6099 0.3771 0.1356 0.2483 0.2052 0.7475 0.4822 0.3249 0.5159 0.4477 0.6723 0.4449 0.2008 0.7008 0.8179 
Note: *** for p< .01; ** for p< .05; * for p< .10 
 
Note: Table 6 shows results for regressions similar to the regressions run in table 5, with the additional specification that the time period is restricted to the post crisis phase defined 
for table 4. Islamic banks seem to over-perform frequently in many countries for all income groups during the post crisis period 
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Table 7 
Intermediation and Variables Explaining Reintermediation between Islamic and Conventional Banks - Controlling for Cross Country 
Variation for the Sample Period 2004 – 2015  
 
Table 7 Cross Country 
Intermediation and Variables Explaining Reintermediation between Islamic and Conventional Banks - Controlling for Cross Country Variation for the Sample Period 2004 – 2015 
 Intermediation Business orientation and Capital adequacy Asset Quality Management Earning Quality Liquidity Service 
quality 
Variable Assets 
Growth 
Loan-
deposit 
Ratio 
Loan to 
Earning 
Assets 
Gross Loans 
Growth 
Fee Income 
Ratio 
Non-deposit 
lending 
Ratio 
Equity Ratio Total Capital 
Ratio 
Loan Loss 
Reserves 
Ratio 
Non-
Performing 
Loans Ratio 
Cost to 
Income 
Overheads 
Ratio 
ROAE ROAA Liquid 
Assets Ratio 
Employee-
Deposit 
Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
C 20.3444*** 90.1204*** 34.6682*** 29.5458*** 5.8984*** 23.9781*** 38.4752*** 49.7114*** 3.3234*** 11.0195*** 88.7911*** 5.9149*** -3.5249*** 1.1591*** 38.9702*** 28.9574*** 
 (3.2264) (3.5333) (1.6017) (4.9532) (0.9023) (2.5200) (0.5579) (1.1891) (0.3996) (1.4883) (0.9767) (0.0750) (1.0209) (0.1397) (1.7889) (0.7415) 
BHR -0.3117 11.7339** -14.7957*** 2.1635 -1.5520*** 10.0794*** 15.8284*** 4.8273** -0.0377 -0.0320 2.6930** 0.5069*** -2.8155*** 0.0185 -0.4111 -1.8491*** 
 (1.7895) (5.0376) (1.3608) (1.4583) (0.3933) (1.5049) (1.0132) (2.0764) (0.0844) (0.7357) (1.2792) (0.0854) (0.8529) (0.1434) (0.8449) (0.6649) 
BGD 6.0059*** -11.5667*** 25.2563*** 4.4365* -1.7571*** -5.6981*** -5.6277*** -5.7686*** -0.0017 1.2769 -10.9452*** -1.0962*** 0.2204 -0.5597*** 1.0675** 2.1249*** 
 (1.7005) (1.3465) (0.6782) (2.5739) (0.6537) (0.2657) (0.1978) (0.4596) (0.1613) (1.4303) (1.4996) (0.0449) (0.8610) (0.0455) (0.4757) (0.6291) 
EGY 0.4652 -22.2386*** -8.7784*** -4.0346** -1.5287 -6.9599*** -7.7443*** -9.2213*** 5.7490*** 8.0979*** -9.4371*** -1.0189*** 1.3180 -0.5694*** -22.8694*** -4.0307*** 
 (1.0401) (0.7685) (2.2273) (1.9452) (0.9871) (0.3129) (0.2150) (0.4965) (0.5010) (1.5061) (1.6752) (0.1393) (2.0871) (0.1590) (3.5993) (0.4249) 
IND 6.3302* 8.7778** 18.9893*** 8.7972* -6.5334*** 2.1720 -2.9410*** 0.3098 -0.9342*** -0.0386 9.2022*** 0.9722*** -2.2658*** -0.4111*** -0.4981 9.6228*** 
 (3.7012) (3.8774) (1.3843) (5.0242) (0.6448) (3.0198) (0.6798) (0.8335) (0.1520) (1.1309) (1.2737) (0.0833) (0.4339) (0.0726) (0.5809) (0.7872) 
IRQ 16.8844*** -8.9168*** 4.9538 21.4436*** 14.5245*** -4.7923*** 25.3677*** 34.2757*** 9.3839***  -29.2537*** -1.8500*** 3.0832*** 2.0745*** 68.0912*** 3.2373** 
 (4.8555) (1.2289) (5.6902) (7.1249) (3.2940) (0.9661) (0.8024) (0.8402) (2.8005)  (2.1846) (0.0344) (1.1830) (0.2516) (3.2223) (1.5577) 
IRN 1.5253 6.3159** 13.3637*** -0.3391 -5.3606*** 6.7116* -2.8124*** 0.6273 -0.3560 4.3277*** 16.5205*** 0.2302** -0.7027 -0.4760*** 4.4797*** -6.2287*** 
 (3.7855) (2.6708) (0.9985) (4.0113) (0.5187) (3.9392) (0.4357) (1.7125) (0.2171) (1.5406) (1.4034) (0.1050) (1.0189) (0.0714) (0.4846) (0.2490) 
JDN 1.3322 -29.3509*** 19.8715*** 1.8322 -2.6379*** 8.3448 -4.3351*** 6.1232*** -1.1196*** -1.1969*** -8.0360*** -1.2031*** 0.5631 -0.2711*** 16.8581*** -3.8838*** 
 (1.0295) (3.1374) (3.0789) (3.8860) (0.4140) (7.1609) (0.1696) (2.0593) (0.2099) (0.3679) (2.4646) (0.0305) (0.8764) (0.0878) (1.5172) (0.9730) 
KEN 7.1399 -9.5679*** 18.5676*** 3.2724 0.6429 - -5.4262*** -6.3402*** -2.9912*** 0.5381 17.0235*** 3.3175*** -1.3804 -0.5157 3.6148*** 6.6630** 
 (5.6606) (1.0206) (5.2189) (6.1195) (1.8687)  (1.5175) (2.1845) (0.5216) (2.2691) (2.5726) (0.1373) (3.0533) (0.3791) (1.3625) (2.6964) 
KWT -1.0046 5.4544*** -3.9425*** -0.4734 -6.3862*** 12.4117*** 4.6568*** 4.7934*** 1.0750*** 1.8841* -5.3160** -0.3135*** -4.8817*** -0.1614 -0.1779 -8.4257*** 
 (1.7912) (1.1701) (1.3106) (2.2313) (0.3328) (2.9667) (0.6704) (1.0616) (0.2773) (0.9822) (2.3989) (0.1036) (0.8875) (0.1762) (0.9257) (0.7911) 
MYS -7.2500*** -5.6315*** 16.9023*** -6.9297*** -8.6418*** -1.7284*** -2.1926*** -1.3021** -0.2683* -0.4556 3.9693*** -0.7254*** -2.4486*** -0.6918*** -2.7990** -4.6377*** 
 (1.8870) (1.1962) (0.6258) (1.9251) (0.3827) (0.4082) (0.0398) (0.5193) (0.1417) (0.3340) (0.5148) (0.0462) (0.3244) (0.0311) (1.4205) (0.1826) 
OMN 16.7166*** 73.0084*** -2.6664 51.7564*** -8.8929*** - 31.6397*** 20.7807*** -3.3055***  47.1271*** 2.0659*** -14.2968*** -3.0625*** 33.4713** -0.1367 
 (1.8623) (10.2241) (17.3294) (0.3229) (2.9772)  (4.4453) (2.5342) (0.7108)  (2.2889) (0.3330) (0.6018) (0.0991) (13.7638) (2.9804) 
PK  -7.1164*** -4.5276*** -24.8407*** 0.8059 -8.8687*** 18.9925*** -1.7157 -8.0439*** 0.5892*** -1.1582 6.8961*** 1.4215*** 2.3335*** 0.3781* -23.5533*** 12.1858*** 
 (2.1719) (0.9400) (3.3977) (3.8578) (0.5032) (4.0161) (1.8255) (0.4887) (0.1274) (0.9886) (1.6206) (0.1561) (0.8081) (0.2172) (3.7009) (0.7775) 
PLT  1.8712 -6.0784 1.7427 5.7953* -4.7566*** 24.5060*** -3.7363*** -2.0821 -3.5322*** -3.9491*** 10.5319*** -0.1646* -1.5593 -0.3326* 9.8767** -2.5036** 
 (1.4302) (7.8406) (2.3510) (3.1207) (0.7130) (7.8048) (0.4138) (1.7936) (0.1649) (0.2328) (2.8061) (0.0874) (1.2840) (0.1711) (4.2640) (1.1350) 
QTR 14.0992*** 8.4518*** 0.8170 18.5024*** -7.9595*** -1.1585 10.2013*** 3.8175*** -1.9914*** -2.3844*** -21.6934*** -0.7386*** 2.6848*** 1.4957*** -5.0908*** -3.7649*** 
 (1.9072) (2.2390) (1.5197) (1.1825) (0.8292) (1.2447) (0.9754) (1.3235) (0.1085) (0.5379) (0.7628) (0.0455) (0.3559) (0.1754) (1.6674) (0.3173) 
KSA  4.5220*** -10.3954*** 11.2963*** 2.4682 1.1966 20.7771*** 10.4265*** 7.9501*** 0.0015 -3.2448*** -1.7932 -0.3159*** -4.7357*** 0.4035*** 6.3411*** -4.3222*** 
 (1.1521) (1.4837) (1.5266) (1.8650) (0.9387) (1.0008) (0.7550) (0.7901) (0.1899) (0.2582) (2.5101) (0.0422) (0.8850) (0.1394) (1.2565) (0.2284) 
SDN -2.0301 7.1160*** -8.3569*** -4.2509** 9.7335*** 22.5098*** -1.7470*** 8.5031*** -2.3331*** -3.7446** -8.1826*** 0.0198 9.1796*** 1.5690*** 1.4135 1.7239** 
 (4.0182) (1.9533) (1.9657) (2.1263) (1.0537) (1.5677) (0.3917) (2.3178) (0.2746) (1.6980) (1.1083) (0.0818) (0.7382) (0.0613) (1.6332) (0.8665) 
SYR -0.0041 -3.9903 -22.1063*** 13.0007 -5.5431** - -3.1212** 19.2981*** 4.4784  -17.6584*** -1.3389*** -0.8497 -0.1070 26.9939*** -4.8836*** 
 (7.4039) (4.1388) (4.9043) (14.4029) (1.7076)  (1.2109) (2.8313) (3.1163)  (3.7571) (0.1150) (2.8522) (0.4350) (2.1845) (0.1441) 
TUR 7.3284** -3.2421* 24.9163*** 2.9925 0.8872 0.0048 0.1045 0.4627 -0.1539 -0.3721 3.4009*** 0.4999*** 2.7091*** 0.1811 4.5349*** -5.0861*** 
 (3.5564) (1.9085) (0.8433) (3.7064) (0.8866) (1.6282) (0.3603) (0.7300) (0.1149) (0.4181) (1.0035) (0.1030) (0.7628) (0.1160) (0.6977) (0.3450) 
UAE 8.1890*** 0.6128 10.5874*** 5.9916** -4.3864*** 1.2760** 2.7114*** 3.1949*** 0.1440 0.8029 -6.1612*** -0.3962*** -3.1349*** 0.0452 1.8598** -3.5512*** 
 (2.6042) (0.9656) (0.9324) (2.9762) (0.2551) (0.5418) (0.2797) (0.7133) (0.2615) (0.8698) (1.2851) (0.0363) (0.7586) (0.1642) (0.7385) (0.7107) 
UK -0.3233 144.5503*** -22.3489*** 10.9888* -10.1595***  29.8843*** 20.0173*** 3.4876*** 3.5154*** 31.1508*** 1.7372*** -10.7285*** -1.4891*** 25.2558*** -5.3351*** 
 (5.8373) (7.6351) (2.9713) (6.2310) (0.9082)  (1.8949) (0.6505) (1.1961) (0.2827) (1.8992) (0.2625) (0.9264) (0.2399) (4.9286) (0.3420) 
YMN -1.6555 7.0632* -17.9553*** -6.1265*** 8.4797*** 10.0969*** -1.4961 -11.8958*** 2.6658*** -0.3743 5.1108* -0.3132*** -6.7306*** -0.8786*** -3.5845**  
 (3.1666) (3.9225) (2.7812) (2.1154) (1.6378) (3.8650) (0.9399) (0.7068) (0.8832) (1.0266) (2.9588) (0.0799) (0.6373) (0.1121) (1.8017)  
Ln 
(Total 
assets) 
-0.6542*** 1.7930*** 1.6748*** -0.9942*** 0.6949*** -1.1427*** -1.8458*** -2.2873*** -0.1099*** -0.6460*** -2.7075*** -0.2439*** 1.0998*** 0.0232*** -2.1024*** -1.4190*** 
 (0.2358) (0.2425) (0.1192) (0.3200) (0.0565) (0.1434) (0.0366) (0.0813) (0.0247) (0.0851) (0.0748) (0.0041) (0.0537) (0.0067) (0.1111) (0.0391) 
34 
 
Fixed 
Assets 
0.2489** -1.9793*** 1.3447*** 0.1064 -0.1565** -0.0990 0.8284*** -0.2340 0.6435*** 1.3316*** 2.0441*** 0.3558*** -0.0662 0.0254*** -0.3815*** 2.5539*** 
 (0.1079) (0.2504) (0.1700) (0.1014) (0.0696) (0.2747) (0.0601) (0.2171) (0.0326) (0.1806) (0.1649) (0.0088) (0.0669) (0.0069) (0.1085) (0.0640) 
Non-
lending 
Assets 
-0.0159 -0.8164***  -0.0731*** 0.0368*** 0.0167 0.0254*** 0.1419*** 0.0307*** 0.0902*** 
 
0.0736*** -0.0080*** -0.0465*** -0.0068*** 0.7472*** -0.0742*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0176)  (0.0195) (0.0056) (0.0148) (0.0038) (0.0084) (0.0020) (0.0078) (0.0144) (0.0004) (0.0059) (0.0008) (0.0089) (0.0021) 
                 Obs. 4229 4348 4652 4186 4353 2151 4652 3304 4150 3281 4554 4613 4640 4643 4567 2486 
Cross 
Sections 
4229 575 605 602 591 340 605 487 566 485 603 604 605 605 599 428 
R-Sq. 0.0679 0.6700 0.4981 0.8859 0.3450 0.2463 0.6721 0.3411 0.3825 0.1755 0.5412 0.7185 0.4082 0.4617 0.7027 0.7820 
Note: *** for p< .01; ** for p< .05; * for p< .10 
Note: Table 7 presents regressions results for regressions that take into account cross country variations in banking performance. The countries in the sample belong to many 
income levels and intrinsic factors may affect the types and levels of risk inherent in the banking business across these countries.  
Key for countries: Bahrain (BHR), Bangladesh (BGD), Egypt (EGY), Indonesia (IND), Iraq (IRQ), Iran (IRN), Jordan (JDN), Kenya (KEN), Kuwait (KWT), Malaysia (MYS), 
Oman (OMN), Pakistan (PK), Palestine (PLT), Qatar (QTR), Saudi Arabia (KSA), Sudan (SDN), Syria (SYR), Turkey (TUR), United Arab Emirates (UAE), United Kingdom 
(UK), Yemen (YMN). 
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Figure 1 
Intermediation Ratios 
 
 
Note: Figure 1 shows the trend in the yearly mean values of the two primary intermediation ratios for Islamic and Conventional banks for the years 2004 – 2015. Islamic banks 
have had substantially high intermediation ratios, surpassing those for conventional banks. Loan to earning assets ratio rose to nearly 70 percent and loan to deposit ratio was 
almost 100 percent for Islamic banks by the end of year 2015. These trends thus give rise to the need for an empirical investigation regarding the hypothesis of reintermediation 
“within” the banking sector and possible drivers of this trend.    
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